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Abstract
The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private
and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their
utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual bud-
get constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public
goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated
with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in
addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed
game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and
the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.
JEL codes: D10, C72, H41
Keywords: Intra-household allocation, household ﬁnancial manage-
ment, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate
spheres.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper addresses the issue of group behavior for a set of individuals consum-
ing both privately and jointly. It presents a model speciﬁcally formulated for
∗CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. CORE is aﬃliated
to ECORE.
†BETA, Université de Strasbourg, France, and Institut Universitaire de France.
1simplicity in terms of two-person household behavior, but which can be straight-
forwardly extended to larger groups. The natural starting point of such analysis
is to discard the so-called unitary approach, which assumes that the household
acts as if it were maximizing a single utility function, possibly a well-deﬁned
social welfare function.
Two alternative non-unitary approaches have been used in the literature on
household behavior:1 the fully cooperative, which entails Pareto-eﬃciency of
household decisions, and the fully non-cooperative, with household decisions re-
sulting from a Nash equilibrium of some game where each individual maximizes
utility under a personal budget constraint. The ﬁrst approach started with mod-
els based on axiomatic bargaining theory (Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy
and Horney, 1981), which result in Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes varying according
to the speciﬁed threat point, itself possibly determined by the solution of a non-
cooperative game (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Chen and Woolley, 2001). Subse-
quent papers proposed ‘collective’ models in order to explore the restrictions on
observable household behavior implied by the assumption of Pareto eﬃciency,
without explicitly referring to a speciﬁc bargaining or other decision making
process (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Browning and Chiappori, 1998). The second
approach is based on two types of non-cooperative games, generally leading to
ineﬃcient equilibrium outcomes. In the ﬁrst type each individual is supposed
to be responsible for a ‘separate sphere’ of joint consumption (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993). In the second type, each individual voluntarily contributes to any
public good (Ulph, 1988, Chen and Woolley, 2001, Lechene and Preston, 2005,
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006b).
In this paper, we want to propose a more general strategic approach, which
includes as sub-cases fully cooperative solutions and fully non-cooperative equi-
librium outcomes, together with intermediate cases. This more general approach
will provide a double parameterization of the set of equilibria, in terms of the
income distribution between the two spouses (allowing to move along the utility
1A synthesis of the ﬁeld is provided by Donni (2008b). See also Donni (2008a) for a general
presentation of the so-called ‘collective’ models of household behavior.
2possibility frontier) and in terms of their autonomy in spending decisions (im-
plying downward movements below that frontier, as autonomy increases). The
two extreme cases, the one where both spouses have full autonomy and the one
where they have none, correspond to a fully non-cooperative and a fully cooper-
ative outcome, respectively. By ﬁlling the gap between these two extreme cases,
our approach provides a theoretical development that has already been hoped
for in the literature.2
The autonomy we are referring to is related to the way in which the house-
hold organizes its ﬁnances. An important distinction appearing in empirical
sociological studies (for instance two surveys of the International Social Survey
Programme of 1994 and 2002, analyzing representative samples of 38 countries)
is the one between money management “systems in which couples operate more
or less as single economic units” and “individualized or privatized systems in
which couples operate largely as two separate, autonomous economic units”
(Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2006, Pahl, 2008). The former comprehend
systems in which one of the two spouses manages all the household money, ex-
cept possibly a fraction left to the other spouse for his/her personal expenses,
but also systems (used by more than half of the couples surveyed by the ISSP)
in which all the household money is pooled in a common bank account and
managed jointly by the two spouses, not necessarily on a 50-50 basis. These
systems aﬀord a good illustration of the economic household models of both
the unitary and the fully cooperative approaches. In contrast with them, we
2For instance, in a recent paper focusing on the household decisions concerning labor
supply, Del Boca and Flinn (2006) write: "We view labor supply outcomes as either being
associated with a particular utility outcome on the Pareto frontier (the one chosen under
symmetric Nash bargaining) or to be associated with the noncooperative equilibrium point.
In reality there are a continuum of points that dominate the noncooperative equilibrium point
and that do not lie on the Pareto frontier, however developing a model that allows such
outcomes to enter the choice set of the household seems beyond our means" (pp. 1-2). Cf.
also Lechene and Preston (2005): "neither the assumption of fully eﬃcient cooperation nor
of complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate description of typical
household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme cases can be seen as a ﬁrst step
towards understanding of a more adequate model" (p. 19).
3ﬁnd two kinds of individualized systems. The ﬁrst one is the ‘independent man-
agement system’ in which each spouse keeps his/her own income separate and
has responsibility for diﬀerent items of household expenditure. This system
may be easily approached by fully non-cooperative economic household models
displaying ‘separate spheres’, either exogenously or endogenously. The other
individualized system (used by 13% of the couples in the ISSP 1994 survey,
17% in the 2002 survey) is “the partial pool in which couples pool some of their
income to pay for collective expenditure and keep the rest separate to spend as
they choose” (Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2006).3
In our approach, the autonomy of each spouse can be evaluated in terms
of the proportion of his/her contribution to the expenditure on public goods
which is directly eﬀected through individual purchases in the market, hence
properly ‘spent as he/she chooses’. The rest of the expenditure on public goods
is supposed to be paid from a ‘pool’ of ﬁnancial contributions of the spouses
computed according to Lindahl prices corresponding to their relative incomes.
The degree of autonomy of each partner may be preliminarily agreed upon
within the household or else be determined by social norms. But it may also
emerge spontaneously as one of the characteristics of a speciﬁc equilibrium of a
non-cooperative game played by the spouses. We assume that in such game they
both take into account not only their own personal budget constraint, but also
the collective budget constraint computed at Lindahl prices. At equilibrium, the
weight of each constraint is evaluated by a Lagrange multiplier, and the relative
weight of the personal constraint may be taken as an index of the degree of
autonomy attained by the corresponding spouse.4
3The terminology ‘partial pooling’ or else ’joint pooling’, applied by sociologists to speciﬁc
systems of ﬁnancial management within the household, should not be confused with the
terminology ‘income pooling’ used by economists to designate situations in which households
behave as if their income was pooled, so that it does not matter which member receives the
income (see Bradbury, 2004, p.504).
4A similar procedure has been used to parameterize the set of equilibria of oligopolistic
games by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (2007) and by d’Aspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009).
4In Section 2, we will brieﬂy present the household decision model, in both
its cooperative and non-cooperative versions, and develop our own general non-
cooperative approach. In Section 3, we will analyze local and observable prop-
erties of the household demand function which may be used to discriminate
among the diﬀerent regimes of household behavior. In Section 4, we will exploit
an example already used by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006), in order
to illustrate the implications of varying degrees of autonomy. We conclude in
Section 5.
2 The household decision model
We study a two-adult household, consuming goods that are either private or





+ be the vector of consumption by the two members of
n private goods and Q ∈ Rm
+ the consumption vector of m public goods. The




, which is deﬁned on Rn
+×Rm
+, increasing and strongly quasi-concave.5
Each member J of the household is supposed to receive an initial income Y J ≥ 0.
The total income of the household is Y = Y A + Y B.W e w a n t t o s t u d y h o w
the household decides on its total consumption given the vector of private good
prices p ∈ Rn
++ and the vector of public good prices P ∈ Rm
++.T h e ﬁrst
private good, assumed to be desired in any household environment, is taken as
numéraire (p1 =1 ).
2.1 The eﬃcient intra-household decision approach
If a collective point of view is adopted inside the household, and a Pareto-optimal
decision is looked for, the usual approach is to ﬁxap a r a m e t e rμ ∈ [0,1] and
5For simplicity, we shall stick to the egoistic case where the utility of each spouse only
depends upon his/her own consumption, either private or public.














+ PQ≤ Y .( 1 )
All the Pareto-optimal decisions can be characterized by varying the Pareto
weight μ. According to the speciﬁc collective decision process (e.g. Nash bar-
gaining with a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the threat point), the Pareto
weight may depend upon the environmental variables (p,P,Y ) as well as on dis-
tributional factors, either environmental or not, but not aﬀecting the individual
preferences (e.g. parameters determining the threat point). As well discussed
in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006a), if the Pareto weight is indepen-
dent of (p,P,Y ), while possibly depending on distributional factors, then the
eﬃcient intra-household decision approach reduces to the unitary model, in the
sense that the household decides as a single decision unit, maximizing under the
common budget constraint pq + PQ≤ Y the utility function










where the function e U may be aﬀected at most by the distributional factors.
However, as soon as the Pareto weights do depend on the environmental vari-
ables (p,P,Y ) (e.g. through the determination of the threat point), the function
e U becomes a ‘generalized’ utility function, depending through μ on prices and
household income, so that the collective model must indeed be distinguished
from the unitary model.
For every J,l e tτJ ¡
qJ,Q
¢
denote the marginal-willingness-to-pay vector for











Under usual regularity conditions, the Pareto-optimal decisions (corresponding









6together with the budget condition p
¡
qA + qB¢
+ PQ = Y .W i t h e a c h s u c h
solution (corresponding to some value of μ), one can thus associate Lindahl (or
personalized) prices
PJ ≡ τJ ¡
qJ,Q
¢
, J = A,B (5)
(such that PA + PB = P) and individual expenditures
ρJY ≡ pqJ + PJQ (6)
(such that ρA + ρB =1 ). Both the Lindahl prices and the expenditure shares
ρJ (J = A,B) are functions of (μ,p,P,Y ) ∈ [0,1] × R
n+m
++ × R+ (where μ may
itself depend upon (p,P,Y )). In particular, we may take ρA = ρ(μ,p,P,Y ) as
the sharing rule applying to the household, and interpret PJQ as J’s tribute to
the household expenditure in public goods.
In the following, we are going to reverse this procedure and start, for a










+ (where QJ denotes
the vector of public consumptions desired by J), such that









e qJ, e QJ
´
(7)
s.t. pe qJ + PJ e QJ ≤ Y J;
(ii)
PA + PB = P and QA = QB = Q.( 8 )





be obtained, according to the second welfare theorem, in a ‘decentralized’ way,
together with the corresponding Pareto weights (which we will leave implicit).
6Notice that this income distribution depends upon environmental factors but may itself
be determined by the distribution of power within the household.
7For the sake of later comparisons, recall the ﬁrst order conditions for a









pqJ + PJQJ = Y J,( 9 )
with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or any public good k s.t.
QJ
k > 0. Together with condition (ii) in the deﬁnition of a Lindahl equilibrium,
they entail the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson conditions for any interior solution.
2.2 The fully non-cooperative approach
An alternative non-unitary model of household decisions is non-cooperative,7
with each spouse having full autonomy in allocating income to public consump-
tion. More precisely, we may deﬁne a game with voluntary contributions to






noting J0s private consumptions and gJ his/her contributions to public goods)








s.t. pqJ + PgJ ≤ Y J.
A Nash equilibrium of this game can be characterized by the ﬁrst order condi-
tions (for J = A,B):
1







pqJ + PgJ = Y J, (11)
with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or any public good k s.t.
gJ
k > 0.
7See Ulph (1988), Chen and Woolley (2001), Lechene and Preston (2005), Browning, Chi-
appori and Lechene (2006b).
8This approach is in sharp contrast with the cooperative approach where each
individual has to choose the same aggregate quantity of each public good (in the
centralised version), so as to maximise a collective objective, determined by the
Pareto weights. In that collective approach, the spouses lose their autonomy in
allocating income to public consumption. Even in the decentralised version of
the eﬃcient household decision approach, the spouses contribute to the collective
acquisition of public goods by paying a tribute computed according to Lindahl
prices imposed upon them.
Both household decision processes, the Pareto eﬃcient behavior (whether
centralised or decentralised) and the fully non-cooperative behavior, appear as
extreme in terms of the autonomy left to the individuals. In reality, intermediate
forms of household behavior, with for instance incomes partially transferred to
a common bank account for collective decisions, can often be observed. In order
to cover such intermediate forms, we will combine the two approaches in the
next subsection.
2.3 The non-cooperative approach with Lindahl prices
We let each spouse decide under two diﬀerent budget constraints, one personal,
the other collective, together with a feasibility vector constraint stating that
the desired public consumptions cannot be higher than the sum of the spouses’
planned contributions. To be explicit, let us deﬁne a household game with
Lindahl prices, associated with the environment (p,P,Y ) ∈ R
n+m









+ .E a c hs p o u s eJ ∈ {A,B} is supposed to choose
a vector of private consumptions qJ ∈ Rn
+, a vector of voluntary contributions
to public goods gJ ∈ Rm














+ PAQA + PBQB ≤ Y
QJ ≤ gA + gB.
The ﬁrst constraint is the personal budget constraint, stating that the individual
income of spouse J should be enough to ﬁnance his/her private consumption
plus the value, at market prices P, of his/her contribution to public consump-
tion. The second constraint is the collective budget constraint, stating that
the household income should be enough to cover the sum of the two private
expenditures plus the value of the desired public consumption. This value is
computed for each spouse J and each public good k by applying the Lindahl
price PJ
k to the desired public consumption QJ
k. The third constraint ensures
the consistency of the two budget constraints, by restraining the desired public
consumptions to be at most equal to the sum of the voluntary contributions of
the two spouses.






that solve both individual programmes simultaneously and
satisfy the feasibility constraints of the two spouses as equalities (QA = QB =
gA + gB), is called a household behavioral equilibrium.





sociated with Lindahl prices
¡
PA,PB¢
, all the constraints in (12), for J = A,B,
are satisﬁed as equalities.
Proof. The feasibility constraint is satisﬁed as an equality by deﬁnition of
a household behavioral equilibrium. By adding the two personal budget con-
straints and using PA + PB = P, we see that the collective budget constraint
can be satisﬁed as a strict inequality only if one at least of the personal con-
straints, say the one of spouse A, is a strict inequality at equilibrium. But, in
10this case, A could increase her utility by increasing simultaneously QA and gA.
Finally, if the collective budget constraint is satisﬁed as an equality, so are both
personal budget constraints.
The ﬁrst order conditions characterizing for agent J a household behaviorial


























with equality for any coordinate i (resp. k)s . t .qJ
i > 0 (resp. Qk > 0), and
κJ ≤ λ
JP, (14)
with equality for any coordinate k s.t. gJ
k > 0. We thus obtain, for private good















with equality if qJ
i > 0. Also, the marginal willingness to pay public good
























with equality if gJ







is simply a normalized Lagrange multiplier associated with the personal budget
constraint.







2 can be used to parameterize the
set of household behavioral equilibria. A Lindahl equilibrium outcome and the
outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contributions to
public goods are also outcomes of two extreme elements of this set, as formally
stated in the following proposition.











with Q = QA = QB is the outcome of a household behavioral equilibrium char-
acterized by θ
A = θ




11behavioral equilibrium characterized by θ
A = θ
B =1is a Nash equilibrium of
the game with voluntary contributions to public goods.
Proof. The collective constraint in programme (12) can be expressed as pqJ +
PJQJ ≤ Y J +
¡
Y −J − pq−J − P−JQ−J¢
, the expression in parentheses being
nil if we take the Lindahl equilibrium values P−J, Q−J and q−J.S i n c e t h e
personal budget constraints are not binding if θ
A = θ
B =0 ,w ec a nt h u sm a k e
programmes (12) coincide with programmes (7) characterizing the Lindahl equi-




is a household behav-
ioral equilibrium if the vectors gA and gB satisfy gA+gB = Q and PgA = PAQ
(m∗ +1equations with 2m∗ unknowns, where m∗ is the number of actually




is a household behavioral equilibrium characterized by
θ
A = θ
B =1 , the collective budget constraint is not binding for both spouses,






solve the two programmes (10) of the
game with voluntary contributions to public goods.








shadow price associated with the personal budget constraint, may be seen as
representing the degree of autonomy of spouse J. Indeed, equilibria with larger
and larger values of θ
J imply that J is more and more concerned with his/her
own personal budget, relative to the collective budget.
In this analysis, up to now, the degrees of autonomy of both spouses are
ﬁxed endogenously, ex post, as characteristics of a speciﬁc equilibrium. We
may however invert the approach, and take the parameters as preliminarily and
conventionally ﬁxed, ex ante, within the household. To deﬁne the new corre-
sponding game, one can assume that each spouse J contributes to the funding
of public goods in two ways. On the one hand, J spends autonomously in the
market place a share θ
J ∈ [0,1] of the market value of his/her contribution to
public consumption: θ
JPgJ. On the other hand, J remits to a common account,
designed to ﬁnance public expenses in which both spouses concur, the comple-
mentary share of the value, now at Lindahl prices, of his/her contribution to
12public consumption. This value is the sum of spouse J’s Lindahl tax on his/her
planned contribution (PJgJ) plus the Lindahl tax the other spouse would have
to pay on what she/he would like J’s contribution to be (P−J ¡
Q−J − g−J¢
).
Notice that by aggregating these values over the two spouses, we obtain, as
expected, the sum of the two Lindahl taxes:
PAgA + PB ¡
QB − gB¢
+ PBgB + PA ¡
QA − gA¢
= PAQA + PBQB. (17)
The new game, which we shall call in the following the θ-household game,h a st h e
same strategies as the household game with Lindahl prices
¡
PA,PB¢




















PJgJ + P−J ¡
Q−J − g−J¢¤
≤ Y J,
QJ ≤ gA + gB.
As will become clear in the following proposition, this programme diﬀers
from programme (12) only in so far as the personal and the collective budget
constraints are now merged into a single personal budget constraint. We show
that the equilibria of the two games coincide for the same value of θ.




is a household behavioral equi-






if and only if it is an equilib-
rium of the θ-household game.
Proof. First notice that, since UJ is increasing, any solution to programme (18)




of the θ-household game necessarily
satisﬁes QA = QB = Q = gA + gB. Using in addition the equality P = PA +
PB, we then see that the budget equation of the θ-household game coincides











PJgJ + P−J ¡
Q−J − g−J¢¤
= PgJ.
13Also, the aggregation of the two budget equations naturally results in the col-




= PAQA + PBQB.
Finally, by simply reproducing the argument applied to programme (12), we see
that the equilibrium of the θ-household game must satisfy the following ﬁrst

















with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or for any public good
k s.t. gJ
k > 0 (implying Qk > 0). These are exactly the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of a household behavioral equilibrium (see (15) and (16)). Consequently,
t h e r ei sac o m p l e t ec o i n c i d e n c eo fa l lt h ec o n d i t i o n st h a tm u s tb es a t i s ﬁed for
¡
qA,gA,Q A,qB,gB,Q B¢
to be a household behavioral equilibrium associated
with the parameter values θ
A and θ
B,a n dt ob eaθ-household game with the
same parameter values now exogenously ﬁxed.
2.4 Separate spheres and local income pooling
Two properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods, proved by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006b), are
that there is generically at most one public good to which both spouses con-
tribute (separate spheres up to one) and that, in the case they both contribute
to one public good, income redistributions have locally no eﬀect on household
expenditures (local income pooling). The ﬁrst property (Proposition 1 in Brown-
ing, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006b)8 can be extended to household behavioral
equilibria (as well as to equilibria of the θ-household game), except in the ex-
treme Lindahl equilibrium case where the degree of autonomy vanishes for both
members of the household (θ
A = θ
B =0 ):
8The result is only ‘generic’, and does not apply in speciﬁc cases, for instance when indi-
vidual preferences over the public goods are identical, as in Lechene and Preston (2005).
14Proposition 4 Take any household behavioral equilibrium characterized by (en-






6=( 0 ,0),a n dl e tm∗ (m∗ ≤ m)b et h e
number of public goods actually consumed by the household, of which mJ are
contributed by spouse J (J = A,B). Then, generically, either mA + mB = m∗
or mA + mB = m∗ +1 : there is at most one public good to which both spouses
contribute.















and corresponding Lindahl prices
¡
PA,PB¢
.A sa l lc o n -
straints in the agents’ programmes (12) are satisﬁed as equalities at equilibrium,
each vector qJ must maximise J’s utility UJ (·,Q) under the constraint pqJ = yJ




to the prices p of private goods. The m∗ positive coordinates of Q and the two
















corresponding to any good k s.t. gJ
k > 0 (for J = A,B), together with the
household budget constraint yA +yB = Y −PQ. Hence, we have mA +mB +1
equations in m∗ +2unknowns. Except in the case of a Lindahl equilibrium
(corresponding to θ
A = θ



















k for any k s.t. Qk > 0, there is overdetermination
if mA + mB >m ∗ +1 : a solution can then only exist for singular parameter
values. It is moreover clear that m∗ ≤ mA +mB, which completes the proof.
By contrast, the second property, that of local income pooling (Proposition
2 in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006b) does not generalize, and can
only be obtained in the extreme case of full autonomy of the two spouses (θ
A =
θ





nB +m∗ positive consumptions is fully determined by nA +nB −2+mA +mB
FOC equations (15) and (16), plus the collective budget equation, provided
mA+mB = m∗+1(joint contribution to some public good k). Personal budget
15equations can then be used to determine the two individual contributions gA
k
and gB
k in Qk. However, contrary to what happens in the full autonomy case,
a change in the income distribution ρ inﬂuences through the Lindahl prices PA
k
and PB
k each spouse’s willingness to pay the public goods, and eventually the
equilibrium outcome. Hence, the local income pooling property appears in our
context as a symptom of fully non-cooperative behavior, lost as soon as we inject
some dose of cooperation.
3 Local properties of household demand
The purpose of this section is to characterize the properties of demand functions
that could be observable and used for discriminating among the diﬀerent types
of household behavior: full cooperation (Browning and Chiappori, 1998), full
autonomy (Lechene and Preston, 2008) and intermediate types, involving partial
autonomy of the two spouses.
3.1 Foundations of the demand functions








two spouses, associated with a given environment (π,Y) ≡ (p,P,Y ) ∈ R
n+m+1
+ ,






Y ≡ (ρ,1 − ρ)Y , and corre-





of the other spouse, the Marshallian conditional demand function of spouse
J ∈ {A,B} can be straightforwardly derived, from his/her utility maximisation
programme (18), with QJ = gA + gB:
xJ ¡
p,PJ,YJ,g−J¢







pqJ + PJgJ ≤ YJ,



















(which will in general be omitted, for sim-
plicity of notation, as arguments of the functions to be introduced in the fol-
16lowing), and consider environment perturbations. More precisely, take an open
set Ω ⊂ R
n+m+1
+ of environment values, with associated Lindahl price functions
PJ : Ω → Rm
+, such that the public goods actually purchased by each spouse
(corresponding to the non-zero elements of equilibrium vectors gA and gB)a r e
the same for each element of this set (that is, such that there is no regime switch-






6=( 0 ,0), we assume equilibrium uniqueness for any
element of Ω,s ot h a tw ec a nr e f e rt ot h ef u n c t i o n sGJ : Ω → Rm
+ (J = A,B), as-
sociating with each environment the individual contributions to public consump-






=( 0 ,0)), when




, so that we must introduce a selection
¡
GA,G B¢
: Ω → R2m
+
such that, according to the proof of Proposition 2, the two functions add











as deﬁned above, we thus take the arguments PJ, YJ and g−J as functions of











P−J (π,Y)GJ (π,Y) and g−J = G−J (π,Y).W ea r et h u s
assuming that UJ has the usual properties required to ensure diﬀerentiability
9The uniqueness assumption is incompatible with the non-generic case of joint contribution
to more than one public good. Indeed, take equilibrium values

e gA,e gB
such that e gA
k and
e gB
k are both positive for any k in some set K of public goods. Clearly, we see by simple
inspection of the spouses’ programmes, that a replacement of elements e gA




k satisfying, for any k ∈ K, gA
k +gB
k = e gA
k +e gB







































will lead to another equilibrium with the same outcome. We thus obtain a system of #K +2
equations (of which only #K +1are independent) in 2(#K) unknowns. Uniqueness conse-
quently requires #K ≤ 1. Lechene and Preston (2008) also rely on the uniqueness assumption,
but with a slightly diﬀerent game where each spouse J chooses, rather than his/her own con-
tribution gJ, his/her preferred household consumption QJ (which should not be less than
g−J), with QA = QB = Q at equilibrium.
17of xJ.
3.2 Full cooperation (θ
A = θ
B =0 )
Consider individual demands ξ
A and ξ






p,P J (π,Y),ρ JY − PJ (π,Y)G−J (π,Y),G −J (π,Y)
¢
(20)
and, recalling that ρA = ρ =1− ρB, the corresponding household demand
ξ (π,Y,ρ) ≡ ξ
A (π,Y,ρ)+ξ
B (π,Y,1 − ρ).
I nt h ec a s eo ft h eunitary model with a ﬁxed Pareto weight μ, the Lindahl prices
PA and PB allowing for decentralization of the spouses’ decisions are indeed
functions of the environment (π,Y) alone, and so are the selections GA and GB.
Of course, expenditure shares ρJ = πξ
J/Y must then be adjusted to changes
in the environment by lump sum transfers between the two spouses, so that we
are in fact referring to the individual demand functions
ξ
J





and to the corresponding household demand function





The household demand has of course the usual properties of Marshallian demand










.A s t o
individual demands, they have the household income Y as an argument and
income eﬀects correspondingly work through household income. This means
that a compensation of those eﬀects at the household level so as to leave the
household utility constant also ensures constancy of individual utilities, which
are just ﬁxed shares μA and μB of household utility. As a consequence, the
individual demand ξ
J
μ also has the usual properties of Marshallian demand,















,w h e r e∂Y ξ
J
μ is a partial
18derivative with respect to household i n c o m e ,t h ei n c o m ee ﬀects being evaluated
relative to household expenditure ξμ.T h u s , f r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of household





obtain: Σμ = ΣA
μ + ΣB
μ.
By using the deﬁnition (21) of these individual demand functions, we may
also make explicit in the expression of the Slutsky matrix Σμ the adjustment of






















In the collective model, with ﬁxed income distribution given by the parameter
ρ and an implicit Pareto weight varying with the environment, the eﬀects de-
scribed by the matrix ∆ of the adjustment in the income distribution required to
keep μ ﬁxed are absent. As a consequence, the household demand ξ (π,Y,ρ) has




diﬀering from the genuine
Slutsky matrix Σμ of ξμ (π,Y) by the deviation matrix ∆, an outer product,
hence with rank at most equal to 1, an observation that reproduces Browning
and Chiappori (1998) main result. We may be more precise about the expression
of ∆ in terms of individual demands xA and xB.
Proposition 5 Under full cooperation (θ
A = θ
B =0 ), the household demand
function ξ (π,Y,ρ)=ξ
A (π,Y,ρ)+ξ
B (π,Y,1 − ρ) has a pseudo-Slutsky matrix
Ψ which deviates from a Slutsky matrix Σμ by an outer product, which can be









Proof. It remains to show that the two expressions of ∆,i n( 2 3 )i nt e r m s
of ξ
A and ξ
B and in (24) in terms of xA and xB, are equivalent. By using
ρ(π,Y)=( 1 /Y)πξ
A

































































































By Euler’s identity applied to ξ
A
μ, a homogeneous function of degree 0,w es e e





































Finally, by referring to the deﬁnition of ξ


















by just making the values of ξ
J
μ and xJ coincide.
It should be emphasized that the deviation ∆ = Σμ − Ψ is independent of
the existence of any public consumption. It results from an aggregation eﬀect,
working in the general case where there is no representative consumer.
3.3 Full autonomy (θ
A = θ
B =1 )
The pseudo-Slutsky matrix of the household demand function ξ ≡ ξ
A + ξ
B
can be easily decomposed by detailing the diﬀerent eﬀects of the environment


































































The Slutsky matrices ΣA and ΣB of the individual demand functions xA and
xB express the direct eﬀects of a change in the environment on individual opti-
mizing decisions. Their sum Σ has also the properties of a Slutsky matrix. The
matrix ∆ is an outer product, with a rank at most equal to r∆ =1 .I t w a s
already present in the fully cooperative case, resulting as already stated from
an aggregation eﬀect.
The matrix Ξ is new. It expresses an externality eﬀect, when this eﬀect
ceases to be compensated by the response of Lindahl taxation to changes in the
environment, as it was in the fully cooperative case. Notice that, because of the
assumption of no regime switching over Ω,i fgJ
k =0for some k,t h e n∂gxJ
n+k =0
and ∂(π,Y )GJ
k =0 ,s ot h a tt h em a t r i x
£
∂gxJ¤
(resp. ΓJ) has at most n + mJ
(resp. mJ) non-zero rows, mJ being the number of public goods contributed
by spouse J. In the absence of public consumption or, more generally, under
preference separability, when the utility derived from each spouse’s private and
public consumption is unaﬀected by the other spouse’s exclusive contributions
to public goods, the matrix
£
∂gxJ¤
vanishes (at least in the regime of separate
spheres), so that Ξ =0 , bringing us back to the result of the fully cooperative
case: the deviation matrix Σ−Ψ has a rank at most equal to 1. But this result
due to inoperative externality eﬀects is of course lost as soon as we abandon
separability. The generic result requires the rank of the deviation matrix to be
equal to an upper bound introduced in the following proposition (a result ﬁrst
formulated by Lechene and Preston, 2008, for the case m∗ = mA+mB−δ = m,
with δ =0under separate spheres and δ =1 ,...,m under joint contribution to
δ public goods).10
10The upper bound established by Lechene and Preston (2008) is in fact independent of
21Proposition 6 Under full autonomy (θ
A = θ
B =1 ), the household demand







Slutsky matrix Ψ which deviates from a Slutsky matrix Σ = ΣA+ΣB by a matrix
∆ − Ξ of rank at most equal to
r∆−Ξ =1+m∗ +m i n
©







The upper bound r∆−Ξ can be neither higher than 1+m∗ nor lower than 1 (for
n =1and either mA =1or mB =0 ).
Proof. (Separate spheres)T h i si st h es i m p l e rc a s e .W eﬁrst determine the
maximum possible rank of Ξ. The matrix
£
∂gxJ¤
has at most n + mJ non-






(consumption changes induced by the sole externality eﬀect should not modify
the expenditure πxJ). Hence, the rank of
£
∂gxJ¤
is at most equal to n+mJ −1.
The matrix ΓJ has at most mJ non-zero rows so that, assuming WLOG that






ΓA cannot be higher
than
rΞ = mB +m i n
©
n + mB − 1,m Aª
= m∗ +m i n
©






Now, by applying Euler’s identity to the functions ξ and xJ, which are homo-
geneous of degree 0,w es e et h a tΨ[π]=Σ[π]=0 ,i m p l y i n g(∆ − Ξ)[π]=0 ,
so that the columns of the matrix ∆ − Ξ are not linearly independent. Hence,
the rank of this matrix is at most equal to n+m∗ −1, since it has only n+m∗
non-zero columns (variations in the prices of the m−m∗ public goods which are
actually not consumed by the household cannot induce changes in the spouses’
contributions). Taking into account this upper bound and simply adding r∆ and
rΞ completes the proof:
r∆−Ξ =m i n
©
n + m∗ − 1,1+m∗ +m i n
©





=1 + m∗ +m i n
©







the value of δ. For simplicity, we have limited our analysis to the generic case δ ∈ {0,1}.I f
m∗ = m (the case contemplated by Lechene and Preston), their result coincides with ours.
22(Joint contribution to one public good) Now suppose that both spouses con-
tribute to the k-th public good. Because of local income pooling, the equilibrium
outcome (except as concerns the way Qk is decomposed into gA
k and gB
k )w i l l
be the same at given prices and household income if we let spouse A make the
w h o l ep u r c h a s eo fp u b l i cg o o dk, compensating her by an income transfer from
B equal to PkGB
k . This transfer triggers the appearance of a new component of















is the n+k-th row of the identity
matrix In+m. Clearly, this component does not increase the rank of the deviation
matrix, since it can be added to ∆ without changing its nature of outer product.
Otherwise, the income transfer brings us back to a regime of separate spheres
with mA and mB −1 public goods contributed by spouses A and B, respectively.
Hence, the maximum rank of ΓB is now mB − 1. However, the relevant upper
bound for the rank of
£
∂gxB¤
remains n + mB − 1, since we cannot apply in
this context the implication xB
k =0= ⇒ ∂gxB
k =0imposed by the assumption
of no regime switching over Ω. Indeed, B’s marginal willingness to pay for the
k- t hp u b l i cg o o dr e m a i n se q u a lt oPk (whereas it is generically smaller than its
price for any non contributed public good), making it eligible for a contribution
by B in response to any perturbation of his environment. By simply reproducing
the argument developed for the case of separate spheres, we thus obtain for the
maximum rank of the deviation matrix:
r∆−Ξ =m i n
©






n + mB − 1,m Aªª
=1 + m∗ +m i n
©







3.4 Intermediate cases (0 <θ
J < 1, J = A,B)
The analysis of the intermediate cases where both spouses have some degree
of autonomy, but also cooperate through Lindahl taxation, can be seen as a
23generalization of the previous cases. The Jacobian of the household demand

































































we can express the pseudo-Slutsky matrix Ψ of the household demand as follows:
Ψ =
ΣA






































































The matrices ΣA and ΣB are again the Slutsky matrices of the individual
demand functions, and their sum Σ has the same properties. The matrix ∆,
an outer product, expresses the aggregation eﬀect. The matrix Ξ expresses
the externality eﬀects, now including income eﬀects through Lindahl taxation,
which may increase its maximum rank








But the new element in the decomposition of Ψ is the sum of the two matrices
ΘA and ΘB, expressing the substitution eﬀects of price changes through the
24Lindahl prices.T h e m a t r i x
£
∂PxJ¤
has at most mJ non-zero columns, since
variations in the prices of the m − mJ public goods to which spouse J does








,s i n c e
£
TGJ¤
has the same m−mJ zero columns.
Hence, the rank of Θ = ΘA + ΘB is upper bounded by mA + mB = m∗ + δ.







2,t h eh o u s e -
hold demand function ξ (π,Y) has a pseudo-Slutsky matrix Ψ which deviates
from a Slutsky matrix Σ = ΣA+ΣB by the matrix ∆−Ξ+Θ,t h er a n ko fw h i c h
is at most equal to
r∆−Ξ+Θ =1+2 m∗ +m i n{n − (m∗ +2 ),2δ}.
The upper bound r∆−Ξ+Θ can neither be higher than 1+2( m∗ + δ) nor lower
than 1 (for n = m∗ =1 ).
Proof. Just add the maximum ranks of ∆, −Ξ and Θ, as previously established,
and take into account the upper bound of the rank of the deviation matrix, which
has at most n + m∗ − 1 linearly independent non-zero columns (since Ψ[π]=
Σ[π]=0 ,i m p l y i n g(∆ − Ξ + Θ)[π]=0 ), to obtain:
min
©










=1 + 2 m∗ +m i n{n − (m∗ +2 ),2δ}.
The strategy of making the results for the two regimes of separate spheres
and of joint contribution to one public good coincide, by exploiting local income
pooling in the latter regime, does not work here. Indeed, the presence of Lindahl
prices depending upon income distribution makes income pooling incomplete.
Hence, our result on the maximum rank of the deviation matrix is now regime
dependent.
The upper bound imposed upon the rank of the deviation matrix can be
used to test the diﬀerent models of household behavior. Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998) have used this upper bound to discriminate between the unitary




has rank 0,a sΨ = Σ, hence





most 2), and have shown that this test requires at least 5 goods. This require-




cannot be higher than 2 if
the number n+m of goods is not larger than 4 (given the linear dependence of
the columns of Ψ introduced by homogeneity of degree zero of the demand func-
tions). Lechene and Preston (2008) have used the properties of Propositions 5
and 6 to discriminate between the cooperative and the non-cooperative models,





has rank at most n+m−1,t h e nΨ can always be expressed
as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank not higher than r such
that 2r+1≥ n+m−1 (with r =1+m according to Proposition 6). If we apply
this lemma to our own Proposition 7, we see that n ≥ 3m∗+4δ+5is needed to
discriminate between full and partial autonomy. If, for instance, there is only
one public good and a single contributor, at least 8 private goods are required.




, given homogeneity of degree 0 of the
demand functions, is then 8. As the observed rank increases from 0 to 8,t h e
test successively rejects the unitary model (at 2), full cooperation (at 4), full
autonomy (at 6) and the collective model as a whole (at 8).
4 Household decisions under varying degrees of
autonomy: an example
In order to study household decisions when we vary not only the income shares
but also the degrees of autonomy, and to make comparisons with previous results
on the game with voluntary contributions to public goods obtained by Brown-
ing, Chiappori & Lechene (2006b), we use their example, with Cobb-Douglas
preferences over one private good and two public goods. We denote by c and
d the private consumptions of spouses A (the wife) and B (the husband), re-
spectively, and by G and H the quantities of the two public goods. The utility
26functions are given by:
UA (c,G,H)=cG5/3H8/9 and UB (d,G,H)=dG15/32H1/2, (30)
so that A cares more about the ﬁrst public good, and B about the second
((5/3)(9/8) > (15/32)2). We further use the following normalization:
p = PG = PH = Y =1 .
The environment in this example is thus described by the vector (1,1,1,1) and
the income distribution by the pair (ρ,1 − ρ).
4.1 Income distribution and public consumptions































Straightforward application of ﬁrst order conditions (16) for optimal public con-








































with an equality when the corresponding public good receives a positive vol-
untary contribution. Hence, a positive contribution by both spouses to both
public goods would imply that the four inequalities above hold as equalities.
Since an equal ratio G/H should obtain for A and B,w et h e ng e t
64(1 − ρ)θ
A +6 3 ρ
32(1 − ρ)θ




64(1 − ρ)+6 3 ρθ
B
32(1 − ρ)+6 3 ρθ
B,
















Figure 1: Household public consumptions as ρ varies
an equality that can be solved for θ
J ∈ [0,1] and J = A,B only if θ
A = θ
B =
0, that is, in the case of the Lindahl equilibrium outcome.11 This illustrates
Proposition 4, implying in this case that the spouses will jointly contribute







of degrees of autonomy, we should expect diﬀerent
equilibrium regimes concerning the contributions for public goods as we increase
A’s income share ρ from 0 to 1:( I )w h e r eB i st h eo n l ys p o u s et oc o n t r i b u t e
to (both) public goods, (II) where A contributes to her preferred public good
and B still contributes to both, (III) where each spouse specializes on his/her
preferred public good, (IV) and (V) symmetric to (II) and (I) respectively (with
inverted roles of A and B). Figure 1 illustrates these regimes, for the household
consumptions of the ﬁrst and second public goods, when the degrees of autonomy
are (0,0) (the upper thick curves), (1,1) (the lower thick curves) and (1/2,1/2)
(the thin curves). The upper curves, corresponding to the Lindahl equilibrium,
are straight lines, increasing in ρ for the ﬁrst public good (the preferred one),
(slightly) decreasing for the second. The other curves are broken lines, each kink
corresponding to a change of regime. Each lower broken line, portraying the
11The corresponding equality would trivially hold, for any values of ρ, θA and θB,i nt h e
singular case where both spouses would equally care for the two public goods. See footnote 8.
28Figure 2: Regime switching values of ρ as θ varies
Nash equilibrium outcome of the game with voluntary contributions, exhibits
two horizontal segments (corresponding to regimes II and IV). These segments
illustrate the local income pooling phenomenon formulated in Proposition 2
of Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006b). Such horizontal segments do
not appear in the other broken lines, a feature that illustrates our claim in
Subsection 2.3.
We have represented, as the sole intermediate case between the Lindahl
equilibrium and the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, the case where both de-
grees of autonomy are equal to 1/2, but all other intermediate cases would be
represented by broken lines similarly located between the thick curves. The
non-monotonicity of the household public consumptions as functions of ρ is a
phenomenon which is not limited to the fully non-cooperative case, but it even-
tually disappears as the degrees of autonomy tend to vanish. Finally, observe
that regime switches occur at diﬀerent values of ρ for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of
t h ed e g r e e so fa u t o n o m y .I nF i g u r e2 ,w eh a v er e p r e s e n t e dt h er e g i m es w i t c h i n g
values of ρ as functions of θ = θ
A = θ
B in the symmetric case of equal degrees
of autonomy. We may notice that the regimes where both spouses contribute to
the same public good tend to expand as individual autonomy tends to vanish.
















Figure 3: Agents’ utilities under symmetric autonomy
4.2 Degrees of autonomy and spouse welfare
Another interesting comparative statics issue consists in looking at the way
the welfare of each spouse varies as the wife’s income share increases for the
same three conﬁgurations of the degrees of autonomy. We represent in Figure
3 A’s and B’s utilities as functions of A’s income share ρ, when the degrees of
autonomy are (0,0) (the smooth thick curves), (1,1) (the broken thick curves)
and (1/2,1/2) (the thin broken curves).
As expected, A0s( r e s p . B’s) utility is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the
three cases, but the three curves cannot be monotonically ranked in terms of the
(common) degree of autonomy. When a spouse’s income share is low, his/her
utility is higher for the fully non-cooperative equilibrium than for the Lindahl
equilibrium. This relationship is reversed as soon as the spouse’s income share
is moderately high. In the intermediate case where the degrees of autonomy
are (1/2,1/2), the relationship of the spouse’s utility with that obtained at the
Lindahl equilibrium follows the same pattern (the two curves cross only once),
but its relationship with the utility obtained at the fully non-cooperative equi-
librium is more complex (the two curves cross several times). Besides, because
of the absence of local income pooling, the curve corresponding to the case
θ
A = θ
B =1 /2 does not exhibit the same horizontal segments as the curve
















Figure 4: Agents’ utilities under asymmetric autonomy
corresponding to the case θ
A = θ
B =1 .
Figure 4 reproduces the same extreme cases, but the thin broken curves






=( 1 /4,3/4). We see that the
husband, whose degree of autonomy is higher, tends to attain the highest utility
level in this case. A higher degree of autonomy has a negative eﬀect on utility
through a loss of eﬃciency, but this eﬀect is more than compensated by a positive
redistributive eﬀect.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have proposed a model of household behavior with both private and pub-
lic consumption, where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but
taking into account, together with their own personal budget constraints, the
collective budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. This
model generalizes both the collective, fully cooperative, model of household be-
havior and the non-cooperative model with voluntary contributions to public
goods. This is achieved in two ways. The ﬁrst is through a generalized game of
voluntary contributions where the set of equilibria can be parameterized accord-
ing to the degree of autonomy of each spouse, measured by the relative pressure
of the two budget constraints at equilibrium, personal vs. collective. The second
31is by ﬁxing as an exogenous parameter the share of public consumption that is
autonomously taken care of by each spouse. The degrees of autonomy introduce
a complementary dimension to the income shares, allowing to consider varia-
tions of household behavior not only along the Pareto frontier, but also inside
the utility possibility set.
Our analysis has shown that the three types of household behavior (full
cooperation, full autonomy and partial autonomy) impose suﬃcient restrictions
on observed household demand to allow for testability under some conditions on
the number of goods (typically, a number of private goods much higher than the
number of public goods). Further work is needed. In particular, the estimation
of the autonomy parameters would be welcome. This has been done in other
ﬁelds. The New Empirical Industrial Organization has been estimating the
so-called conduct parameters which measure the relative weight of competitive
toughness and play in the analysis of ﬁrm behavior a role similar to the one of
our degrees of autonomy in the analysis of household behavior.
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